The ought from an is fallacy

For posterity, the is/ought fallacy can be expressed as follows:

The is-ought fallacy occurs when the assumption is made that because things are a certain way, they should be that way. It can also consist of the assumption that because something is not now occurring, this means it should not occur. In effect, this fallacy asserts that the status quo should be maintained simply for its own sake. It seeks to make a value of a fact or to derive a moral imperative from the description of a state of affairs.

In a sentence, "that something is happening cannot inform us about whether it should happen"

1.0 If the is-ought fallacy is applicable to reality, and logically we know it to be true, then all moral statements or values , (ought's,) must not come from what is. If any ought's exist they cannot be found in what is, instead they must be found from what "is-not." That is that all things can be sectioned into the set of things that are and everything else belongs in the set of things that are not.

1.1 That is, we assume that all things that are currently happening are a kind of royal "is." All things that are not happening are a royal "is-not." Therefore if there is truly any "ought" that exists, then it must come from what "is-not." This doesn't mean that any "ought's" exist at all, only that in agreement with the fallacy, all that is, “is,” that set, cannot inform us of the oughtness of anything that is. 

1.1.1 We can also remove all ought's from existence if we can show that all things that are possible to happen are currently happening. 

2.0 However, the law of excluded middle prevents anyone from doing contradictory actions, therefore at least half the things that could be done, aren't being done. Therefore there are at least half the possible actions of the universe that remain able to produce an ought.

2.1 If we say that we take some agent A and some agent B, and they each do logically contradictory actions, that is A does what is logically contradictory to B and B does what is logically contradictory to A, it might be said, we thereby have removed all non happening events. This is not possible, because the excluded middle applies as much to the individual agent as it does logically contradictory events.

3.0 Now suppose that some "is" is ceasing. Like all the corn on the planet is dying, all the water is drying up, all the teenagers will start cussing correctly, memes are being outlawed.

3.1 We can predict from the future "is-not" status that we ought prevent some "is" from becoming an "is-not." All future events have to be part of the “is-not.” Even in the case where the future "is-not" status is preferred, this future status still remains objective to the present situation. Though we might predict different outcomes, (objective,) or desire different outcomes, (subjective,) we could objectively behold that given some stimuli that some result is objectively more likely, or even objectively certain.

3.1.1 So while the “is” that is currently happening cannot inform us that it ought to happen, the same event happening in the future we could develop “ought's” from and we could objectively agree on potential results of these future “ought's” even if we wish to act on that ought now. 

4.0 To summarize, getting an, “ought from an is” must fit a certain criteria, that it be of the form: “Some action (q) is being done, THEREFORE (q) should be done.”

5.0 It’s a fairly straight forward point. Using it to disqualify arguments written of any kind, even fallacious arguments, would then be incorrect, unless the use of it was, “I am presenting an argument, therefore I should present an argument.”

6.0 Then to ought's being moral standards or values. Anything that we “ought” do implies that there is a correct course of action given some stimuli. This is most definitely a subjective stance. This, because given stimuli X we ought to do Y, or If X then Y means that Y is subject to X happening. But in the case where X is a far off event, it’s not happening now. In this case, as was shown above, this X is not happening. Instead we can hold this X and its subsequent Y in a quasi-objective state. Y even in this state is subject to X, but the system of them together is objective. Let's call this system R. 

6.1 In order for morality to be objective, it must be shown that R, which we already know is objective, is also an ought. From the paragraph above we can see that all ought's are subjective responses to some stimuli. And here we might find that we have reached a terminal point. We can keep creating systems and keep holding them in objective fashion, nesting systems upon systems, all the way down to the last turtle. And this is true unless we have a different set of circumstances that produce morality.

6.1.1 Could benevolence be such a thing? After all, benevolence is a type of behavior that puts the needs/wants of a person above the one acting benevolently. So by definition, it must be objective. Can it be said that we ought to do it with the infinite regress of objective conditionals? If we could it would need to be such that Y is without a stimulus. Something we do without provocation. Reason, perhaps?

6.1.2 Whether or not we have a stimuli, we think. We even fabricate at random by unknown processes, (electro-chemical coding traps ideas/concepts/and learnings, such that we cannot extract it.) but then this reason becomes an “is.” This is the current state of things. So we cannot draw an ought from it. That is, “That I reason is not enough to say I should reason.” 

6.1.2.1 So we need an “is-not” in regards to reason to establish an ought. So easy enough, what “is-not” happening is my inability to reason. In isolation the inability to reason might not be so much an inability in the sense that one is incapable instead it could also mean that reason is experiencing a diminishment or a punishment. For instance, reasoning to the end that some king is unjust. A conclusion that might cost your life. But reason happens in the brain. What compels a person to act on reason? Be it in speech or in deed, could we indeed have reason if we could not act on it? Or rather, what is the use of reason if we cannot act on reason?

6.1.2.2 It would only be reason name only. And reason isn’t in a test tube, it’s in agents. Lest an agent be able to act on their reason, reason is just word. So to have reason means to not only reason to some end, but then to act towards that end. So by this fact, the “is-not” that person might seek is the inability to act on reason. Which is convenient for this idea, since actions can be prevented, reason cannot.

6.1.2.2.1 When we examine this “is-not” can we derive an ought from it? It is only one step towards an ought to identify the “is-not;” it is another step entirely to identify some “ought” that we can pull back to our present selves. 

6.1.2.2.2 That a person cannot act on their reason, I believe this is called, “self determination,” then we ought to restrain the restraints. Keep in mind, this is an “is-not.”. We know that humans reason, to restrain the act that fulfills that reason is a denial of nature. Such a denial might be beneficial for a king’s rule when the reason manifests itself in the act of disloyalty or rebellion, but logically speaking, then it would follow that king’s reason, and by extension, the king’s rule, might be denied for the same reasons the king uses. 

6.1.2.2.3 This is self defeating. Reason would have us not do logically contradictory things, like denying the reason of one agent with reason A, but then denying reason A in regards to the self. 

6.1.2.2.4 So the ought we find is that we ought not be self contradictory.

6.1.2.3 We can say that we ought not be self contradictory because it is-not happening.

6.1.3 This is predicated by the “is-not” that we see because we can reason and follow that reason to its end.

6.2 This being able to be systematized to an objective state of far off event in as much as X is some future event, and Y is the moral action in response to the event. In this case, X being the inability to act on reason and Y being we should not contradict ourselves, but we’d need reason to not contradict ourselves.

7.0 We do reason, therefore we ought not contradict ourselves.

8.0 While this looks like an ought from an is, I just showed the steps for how I arrived at this ought. And if this is the case, that something looks like an “ought” from an “is,” is not sufficient to conclude that some ought should be disqualified because a person can attach it to some is.